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Salvaging Brexit
The Right Way to Leave the EU
Swati Dhingra 
On June 30, a week after the British public voted to leave the eu, Theresa May gave a speech launching her candidacy for prime minister in which she declared, “Brexit means Brexit.” 
Her message was straightforward: even though she herself had sup-
ported remaining in the eu, she would not hesitate to implement the 
will of the voters. Yet months after assuming office, May has yet to 
answer crucial questions about what a British exit, or Brexit, would 
mean for trade, immigration, and financial services. It is still not at all 
obvious what Brexit will actually look like.
That’s because the referendum has confronted the government with 
two distinct but related problems: how to leave the eu as painlessly as 
possible and how to reverse the years of economic neglect that have 
divided the country. Solving each will require hard choices, and what-
ever the politicians decide, some of their supporters will feel let down. 
With this in mind, they should prioritize prosperity over politics and 
defy radicals on both sides of the debate. Simply ignoring the referen-
dum result would be politically untenable. But abruptly abandoning 
the single market, which guarantees the free movement of goods, ser-
vices, and people, would cause widespread economic hardship.
The best path forward, then, is to strike a temporary deal to keep 
the United Kingdom in the single market—a deal similar to that which 
Norway enjoys. Such an arrangement would remove uncertainty 
among businesses over the United Kingdom’s future relations with 
its biggest trade and investment partner and would buy time to 
work out a permanent settlement. Assuming it can be sold politi-
cally at home, such an interim solution should also prove palatable 
to the eu.
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But trade policy can achieve only so much. In order to respond to 
the grievances that led to the Brexit vote in the first place, the British 
government also needs to take big and immediate steps to restore 
economic equality and raise the country’s potential for future growth. 
To that end, it should rebuild its creaking infrastructure and overstressed 
public health and educational systems. Only by targeting the underlying 
sources of economic anxiety can policymakers finally begin to heal a 
broken nation.
IT’S NOT EU, IT’S ME
In order to understand why the British people chose to leave the eu, 
it’s necessary to understand what has happened to the British economy 
in the four decades since the country voted for membership in the 
European Economic Community. In 1975, two years after it acceded 
to the eec, the United Kingdom held a referendum on continued 
membership. As in this year’s vote, those who wanted to leave in 1975 
claimed that doing so would lower prices, boost wages, and create jobs 
for British workers. A majority of the public rejected these claims, 
and 67 percent of voters chose to remain in the eec. This time around, 
obviously, the result was different; only 48 percent opted to stay. 
The shift in public opinion can be explained by the intervening 
increase in economic stress. Although the “leave” campaign’s message 
in 2016 centered on the need to regain British sovereignty, curtail 
immigration, and stop contributing to the eu budget, many Britons used 
their votes to express anger at the country’s political establishment 
and its failed economic policies instead. That shouldn’t be surprising: 
even as the economy has grown, the gap between the top and the bot-
tom has stretched wider and wider. In 1980, the top ten percent earned 
2.7 times as much as the bottom ten percent; in 2013, the top ten 
percent took home 3.7 times as much. This is because, for decades, 
median wage growth has lagged behind average wage growth. In other 
words, the pie has grown, but workers have seen their slices grow far 
slower. The financial crisis only made things worse. From 2003 to 
2014, all workers suffered as average weekly earnings shrank by 
1.8 percent, but the poorest did the worst, as median earnings slid by 
2.8 percent over that period. It’s not enough to just blame the crisis, 
however. As far back as 2000, the share of working-age men without 
qualifications (having left school before the age of 16) who were not 
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active in the labor force had reached 30 percent, compared with less 
than four percent two decades earlier. By April 2016, that figure stood 
at over 43 percent. 
The state bears most of the blame for these problems. For years, it 
has underinvested in public services, eroded the power of trade unions, 
and failed to promote employment or raise wages. The national min-
imum wage remained low by international standards for decades, until 
a Labour government raised it in 1998. The result has been that for 
many in the United Kingdom, having a job is no guarantee of financial 
security. Half of poor children in the country have parents who work 
but are nevertheless below the poverty line. 
In recent years, one of the worst examples of government under-
investment has been in health care. In 2010, the new coalition govern-
ment of Prime Minister David Cameron pledged to protect the National 
Health Service from austerity. Despite this guarantee, however, 
health-care spending has grown by just 1.2 percent per year since 2010, 
compared with 3.7 percent between 1949 
and 1979 and over 6.7 percent from 
2007 to 2009, during the financial cri-
sis. The United Kingdom now ranks 
13th among the 15 original members 
of the eu in the percentage of gdp spent 
on health care. Cuts to the nhs’ budget made in the name of efficiency 
have led to perverse policies, such as hiring expensive temporary 
staff to meet the shortfall in permanent employees. Remaining staff 
feel underpaid and overworked.
And it’s not just health care where the government has failed. In 
2010, the coalition government also reduced child benefits, a policy 
that researchers at the Institute for Fiscal Studies estimated would 
push an extra 200,000 children into poverty by 2016. Sure enough, the 
share of children living in relative poverty ticked up from 27 percent 
in 2011 to 29 percent in 2015, an increase of 300,000 children, even as 
the economy recovered.
The imposition of fiscal austerity after 2010 was the coup de grâce for 
many of the country’s most deprived regions. London’s poorer bor-
oughs, England’s forgotten seaside towns, and the declining industrial 
areas of northern England, the South Wales Valleys, and Glasgow have 
experienced the biggest declines in welfare payments over the last six 
years. In contrast, the more prosperous south and east of England have 
The British state bears  
most of the blame for the 
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seen only small spending reductions, since many of the cuts were to 
public spending that mostly benefited poor individuals. Reductions 
in disability benefits, housing-support payments, and unemployment 
assistance hurt most those areas that already had the highest shares 
of claimants.
DIDN’T WE ALMOST HAVE IT ALL
Real as the anger is, scapegoating the eu for British economic hardship 
is unfair. In fact, it’s doubly so: not only is the British government 
responsible for the problem, but the eu has actually mitigated its 
impact. Forty years of data point to the overwhelming conclusion 
that eu membership reduced the price of goods, increased real wages, 
and helped fund British public services. 
The eu did all this by reducing barriers to trade, which increased 
competition among firms and caused them to slash the markups they 
charged consumers. According to a study by the economist Harald 
Badinger, for example, markups for manufacturing goods across ten 
eu states fell from 38 percent to 28 percent of costs between 1981 and 
1999. What’s more, as markets integrated, consumers could more 
easily purchase products from other countries, which harmonized 
prices across borders. The economist John Rogers has shown that the 
local prices of dozens of household goods—from bread to wine to 
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sweaters—converged dramatically between 1990 and 2001. By the end 
of that period, prices varied within the eu about as much as they did 
within the United States. 
At the same time as the eu lowered prices, it also raised British 
workers’ job prospects, since British businesses expanded production 
as they obtained cheaper access to European markets. According to 
researchers at the Institute for Fiscal Studies, this helped raise real 
wages in the United Kingdom and caused unemployment to fall by 
0.7 percentage points between 1988 and 1999. Firms also intensified 
their research and development to respond to increased competition, 
which in turn increased overall economic productivity. 
Another pillar of the eu, the free movement of people, has driven 
both economic growth and economic fear. Over the past four decades, 
workers from the poorer countries of 
Europe have flocked to the relatively 
prosperous United Kingdom—over a 
third of the 8.5 million immigrants 
currently in the country hail from else-
where in the eu. Ever since the United 
Kingdom’s accession to the eec, many 
voters have feared that these immigrants 
would displace British workers. This concern played an important 
role in the June referendum: the higher an area’s share of immigrants 
or the larger its recent increases in immigration, the more likely it 
was to vote to leave. 
Yet immigration from other eu states has not actually harmed 
British citizens. Even after the eu expanded in the first decade of this 
century to include much of eastern Europe, there is no evidence that 
British-born workers experienced higher unemployment or lower wages 
in counties with above-average numbers of eu immigrants. Nor has eu 
immigration exacerbated inequality by harming less skilled workers, 
the segment most vulnerable to competition from immigrants. Changes 
in wages and joblessness for this group show little correlation with 
changes in eu immigration. 
European immigrants have even been a boon to public finances, 
because they pay more in taxes than they consume in government 
services. Euroskeptics often accuse immigrants of robbing British 
citizens of places in schools and hospitals, but given immigrants’ net 
contributions to such services, these deprivations are more accurately 
Economic hardship, 
inequality, and political 
alienation are not unique 
to the United Kingdom.
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characterized as the result of chronic government underinvestment. 
Nor have immigrants from the eu undermined social stability: in 
2013, researchers at the London School of Economics and University 
College London found that the large wave of economic immigrants 
from eastern Europe after the enlargement of the eu in 2004 did not 
lead to more violent crime or theft.
BREAKING UP IS HARD TO DO
Despite the benefits of staying in the eu, of course, voters chose to 
leave it, and now the government must respect their decision. But 
there are several different forms that the departure could take. The 
most sensible option would be a deal similar to Norway’s, whereby the 
United Kingdom would remain a member of the single market by 
joining the European Economic Area, a group of all the eu members 
and three nonmember countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway) 
that trade freely with the eu but do not participate in its political 
institutions. Under this arrangement, the costs of trade would still rise, 
since the United Kingdom would face some nontariff barriers that 
currently apply to the non-eu members of the eea. To avoid duties, 
manufacturers would have to prove that their goods qualified as 
made in the United Kingdom, for example, a costly process thanks to 
increasingly complex global supply chains. The European Commission 
might also impose tariffs on British exports if it ruled that they 
were being sold to the eu below market price. In 2006, for example, 
Norwegian salmon exporters who received financial support from the 
Norwegian government incurred a 16 percent tariff. The United King-
dom would also lose the ability to influence future reductions in trade 
barriers, such as those the eu is considering in the service sector, 
which makes up a large part of the British economy. But by preserving 
access to the single market, this approach would minimize the losses 
from reduced trade and investment. 
Obtaining a Norwegian-style deal wouldn’t be easy, however. For 
one thing, it would require joining the European Free Trade Associa-
tion—composed of the three non-eu members of the eea plus 
Switzerland—which might be unwilling to let the United Kingdom 
in. Norway has already said it might block British participation, as 
the relevant agreements have evolved over 20 years to reflect the needs 
of the association’s current members. But Norway’s opposition is 
not certain, and such a deal should prove more palatable to the eu 
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than any other option, since if it were framed as a temporary measure, it 
would give the union time to think about how it will deal with emerging 
threats to the European project. The economic hardship, inequality, 
and political alienation that led to the Brexit vote are not unique to 
the United Kingdom; they are also present in France, Italy, and the 
Netherlands, any of which could soon face a similar campaign to leave. 
The eu must walk a fine line: if it is too soft on the United Kingdom, 
a host of other countries will want to renegotiate their positions in 
the eu, but if it is too harsh, it will further alienate anti-eu voters.
Perhaps a greater challenge would be getting the British public to 
accept the continued free movement of eu citizens, sure to be part 
of any Norwegian-style deal but a redline for many Britons in the 
leave camp. As a result, some prominent figures, including Rupert 
Harrison, former chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, have 
floated the idea of an “eea minus” option. Such a deal would involve 
a comprehensive British-eu free-trade 
agreement similar to the Swiss-eu deal 
but, crucially, also restrictions on immi-
gration. From the eu’s perspective, how-
ever, this would be a nonstarter. Free 
movement of labor is the sine qua non of the eu, and the Swiss had 
to accept it in order to get deep access to the single market. Even 
after a referendum in 2014 in which the Swiss people voted to limit 
immigration from the eu, Brussels refused to let the country impose 
any limits on movement without losing all of its eu financial and 
trading rights. Besides, Switzerland’s deals with the eu took over 
20 years to negotiate, time the United Kingdom can ill afford. And 
to keep the club together, the eu cannot make leaving too easy. 
The only path that would allow the United Kingdom to control 
immigration and free it from eu regulations and trade policy would 
be to exit the single market entirely, leaving the country with no 
comprehensive free-trade agreement with the rest of Europe. Were 
it to take this route, the United Kingdom would face harsh external 
tariffs, which, in an ironic twist, would hit hardest some of the areas 
that voted to leave.
To understand what’s at stake, consider the northern industrial 
city of Sunderland, which voted for Brexit by a 22 percent margin. 
Sunderland is home to one of Nissan’s most cost-efficient manufactur-
ing plants, and last year, it began producing the company’s newest luxury 
Free movement of labor is 
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car, the Infiniti Q30. About half of British car exports currently go to the 
eu, which they can enter duty free. Should the United Kingdom leave 
the eu without a trade deal, it would be treated just like any other 
non-European trading partner, subject to the default World Trade 
Organization rules, under which the eu would charge its usual ten per-
cent import tax on cars. No longer so attractive to Nissan, Sunderland 
could turn into Detroit. 
Nissan isn’t the only company facing this problem. In a 2014 survey, 
the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders, a British industry 
group, found that 70 percent of its members expected that leaving the 
eu would hurt their business in the medium or long term, and three-
quarters felt that it would reduce foreign investment in the United 
Kingdom. History suggests that they’re right: the British car industry 
spent a decade stuck in the slow lane until the country merged with 
the single market in 1973, allowing British manufacturers to get the 
same access as French and German ones.
To counter such gloomy predictions, the leave campaign set out 
grand visions of resuscitating trade within the Commonwealth or 
reorienting trade toward China or the United States. On the surface, 
these sound like great ideas, but nothing currently stops the United 
Kingdom from trading with those countries as a member of the single 
market. (Indeed, Germany does exactly that, and with great success.) 
Making up for the loss of membership in the single market would 
prove difficult, moreover, no matter how ambitious the new trade 
deals outside the eu were. For one thing, economists have long known 
that countries trade most with large, rich, nearby markets—and in the 
case of the United Kingdom, that’s the eu. For another thing, trade 
agreements take many years to negotiate. And without the clout of 
the eu, British trade negotiators would find it far harder to defend the 
United Kingdom’s interests against those of large countries such as 
China and the United States. 
Besides, with tariffs at record lows, these deals have become less 
about reducing import duties and more about harmonizing regula-
tions. Many countries outside the eu still lag far behind the United 
Kingdom in product and labor standards, and so bringing British 
rules in line with less stringent countries would prove politically 
difficult and often undesirable. In short, despite what the Brexiteers 
promised, abandoning the single market would do grave damage to 
the British economy. 
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LONDON BRIDGE IS FALLING DOWN
Not only would striking a trade arrangement with the eu soften the 
blow of leaving; it would also give the United Kingdom the time and 
resources to get its own house in order. Over the past two decades, the 
fortunes of the wealthiest Britons have risen, while the poorest have 
been stuck in a cycle of falling wages and unfulfilling work. Geography 
has become destiny: London and the prosperous south and east of 
England feel increasingly like a different country from the declining 
industrial north. In the referendum, the latter voted as though it were 
seeking revenge on an elite it felt had forgotten it. Indeed, the lower 
the wage growth in a given region, the more likely its people were to 
vote to leave. Unfortunately, such votes were masochistic. The same 
regions that voted to leave are those that depend the most heavily on 
eu trade, investment, and transfers. Leave voters were also poorer 
and less educated than the average—the very group that will suffer 
more than most if the United Kingdom leaves the eu.
There are promising signs that May and her allies within the 
Conservative Party have recognized the scale of the problem. Since 
the vote, they have proposed a number of progressive policies, such 
as transferring funds from richer regions to poorer ones and giving 
workers representation on company boards. Although they would help, 
however, such changes would not go far enough. The United Kingdom 
needs to make a more fundamental shift away from its neoliberal 
ideology, which presumes that government efforts to promote growth 
never work and that balanced budgets are next to godliness, back to its 
earlier tradition of investing heavily in assets that raise long-term growth. 
Even the most ardent believers in the free market, including Germany 
and the United States, support their domestic industries—through 
public investment in research and development, for example—because 
they recognize that this kind of spending promotes future growth 
and economic equality.
Nothing illustrates what has gone wrong with the United Kingdom 
better than education. Today, poor British children perform worse in 
school than their richer classmates, and the correlation between socio-
economic background and school performance, although present in 
every rich country, is stronger in the United Kingdom than in many 
others, including countries as varied as Greece, Russia, and Spain. This 
broken educational system not only stifles social mobility but also 
depresses labor productivity. To fix it, the government needs to find 
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ways to recruit the best teachers and invest more in training them. At 
the same time, policymakers should make sure they are using the right 
yardstick when measuring success. Past attempts at educational reform 
have failed to improve social mobility, so the government should judge 
new proposals by how much they will improve the performance of 
children from disadvantaged backgrounds and not just based on average 
attainment. The silver lining of the referendum result is that, by high-
lighting the many places where social mobility is lowest, it appears to 
have created the political will for such policies.
Public investment in health care would also spur economic activity. 
Such moves have worked before: government regulation of prices in 
the nhs forced drug firms to innovate 
and encouraged competition from low-
cost producers; support for biomedical 
research in public universities in the 
postwar era helped build a world-class 
pharmaceutical industry in the United Kingdom. Stepping up health-
care spending would not only improve public health but also generate 
jobs in industries linked to health care and improve corporate bottom 
lines by creating a healthier work force. 
The United Kingdom’s problems aren’t limited to education and 
health care, however; the country also spends less on infrastructure 
than most other rich nations. Many of its roads, houses, and power 
grids were built in the 1960s and 1970s and are now coming to the ends 
of their useful lives. The electrical system has deteriorated to the point 
that earlier this year, the country’s energy regulator warned that power 
shortages could be coming. Investing in infrastructure now would create 
jobs and lay the foundations for future growth, just as it did for the 
United States during the Great Depression, when such spending 
put millions of Americans to work improving the roads and laying 
the sewer pipes and other equipment that enabled the country’s 
subsequent recovery. 
Finally, the British government should ramp up its investments 
in innovation, focusing on firms that have high growth potential. 
Innovation produces social benefits—technological advances that 
can be used in other sectors, for example—beyond the returns to 
private investors, so it deserves government support. Yet the British 
government spends much less on promoting innovation than do the 
governments of France, Germany, and the United States. Since such 
Unfortunately, the vote to 
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Swati Dhingra
100 f o r e i g n  a f fa i r s
spending makes workers more efficient, it’s no surprise that labor 
productivity in the United Kingdom is seven to 39 percent lower than 
it is in those countries. 
The British government also does too little to encourage investment 
in small and medium-sized enterprises, diverting private investments 
away from young businesses and toward safer activities such as real 
estate. Smaller companies form the backbone of the British economy, 
providing 60 percent of private-sector jobs and generating high returns 
relative to the support they receive. Yet private commercial investors 
tend to think in the short term and are reluctant to support such busi-
nesses, especially during recessions. It wasn’t until 2012 that the gov-
ernment attempted to help by setting up the British Business Bank to 
lend to these firms. And even now, the bank’s total lending remains 
small compared with that of similar facilities in the United States. 
The government should dramatically scale up the bank’s operations. 
None of these ideas are radical. But for them to work, politicians must 
be willing to spend dramatically more than in the past; a few percent 
of national income will not do the trick. 
The Brexit vote has handed the country a gargantuan challenge, 
and no response to it will satisfy everyone. But if the British govern-
ment can maintain access to the single market and invest in education, 
public health, infrastructure, and innovation, then it will contain the 
immediate damage and may even begin restoring prosperity and hope 
in the country’s forgotten places.∂
